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Abstract  
Corruption is a current problem embedded in almost all sectors of society. In order 
to fight it, the causes must be identified and studied. The literature shows that variables 
such as press freedom, the level of democracy, the level of development, religion, 
education, and more, of a country influence how corruption is seen and practised. The 
focus of the dissertation will be on the variable Trust and how it affects not only the 
perception and experience of corruption themselves but what is the impact of social trust 
on the gap between these two variables.  
The data used to test the hypotheses was withdrawn from several sources for the 
years 2011 and 2013. Two models were written, one to test the impact of some variables 
on the gap between the perception and experience of corruption and the other one to test 
how the perception of corruption is affected by some chosen variables. Panel data for 30 
countries and the results were obtained by the method of Ordinary Least Squares with 
random effects. 
The results show a negative and significant relation between trust and the gap of 
perception and experience of corruption, which means that a country with high levels of 
trust tends to have a smaller discrepancy between the perceived and experienced levels 
of corruption. On the other side, despite the fact of trust influencing the gap, it is not 
relevant when tested only with the perception levels. Finally, the empirical results find 
that the experience levels of corruption has a substantial effect on the Corruption 
Perception Index, revealing that countries with high experience levels are likely to have 
a worse score on such index, which means greater perception levels.   
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1. Introduction 
Over the last decades, corruption has been one of the most discussed themes not 
only in Portugal but all over the world due to the scandals among the political and 
economic sectors. For example, Odebrecht and Braskem, Brazil’s biggest construction 
firm and a petrochemical firm respectively, due to bribing officials to secure contracts, 
will have to pay almost 3 billion euros to the authorities in the United States of America, 
Brazil and Switzerland (BBC News, 2016). Also in Brazil, Eike Batista, once the richest 
man in the country, is sought for allegedly transferring over than 14 million euros through 
offshore accounts to the former governor of Rio de Janeiro, Sérgio Cabral (The New York 
Times, 2017). Deutsche bank was also fined around 540 million euros by the American 
and English authorities due to money laundering (The Guardian, 2017a).  Juergen 
Mossack and Ramon Fonseca, founders of Mossack Fonseca, the firm at the centre of the 
Panama Papers scandal, were arrested as a result of a bribery scandal, also linked with 
Brazilian companies (The Guardian, 2017b).  Rolls-Royce, the engine maker, will pay to 
the American, English and Brazilian authorities a total amount of 750 million euros, after 
bribery and corruption claims (Sky News, 2017). The Samsung chief Lee Jae-yong has 
been interrogated by the prosecutors because of the alleged donations Samsung has given 
to non-profit foundations in exchange of political support (CNN Money, 2017).  Thailand 
considers to convict officials that are caught in corrupt acts involving amounts above 25 
million euros with the death penalty (Independent, 2017) (see more examples on 
Heidenheimer, 1996; Bowler and Karp, 2004; Morris and Klesner, 2010). These events 
have changed the trust in institutions and in society as a whole and consequently the 
behaviour and perception of corruption. 
Although it is impossible to perfectly measure it, corruption is one of the main 
concerns on governments’ agenda, so it is fundamental to understand what are the causes 
and consequences of it, so that corruption can not only be fought but also avoided. Some 
authors (see examples Serra 2006; Aidt, 2009; Andersson and HeyWood, 2009; Ortiz-
Ospina, and Roser, 2016) through their researches found that corruption and development 
are negative correlated, that is, a country with a low degree of perceived corruption is 
likely to have a high degree of development. Therefore, as a threat that hinders countries’ 
development and growth, the importance and relevance of additional studies on this topic 
is justified. Moreover, according to the World Bank (2016), almost 1 trillion euros is paid 
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each year in bribes, having a multiple effect, harming the economy even more than that 
amount. 
 So far, a lot of scholars have analysed the impact of corruption on social trust and 
others on the inverse relationship. However, few of them have made a clear distinction 
between perceived and experienced corruption (see examples Olken, 2009; Steves and 
Teytelboym, 2011). Thus, the present dissertation intends to analyse how social trust and 
the gap between perception and reality of corruption are related, trying to fulfil the scarce 
and unclear research about this specific matter which has been considered one of the main 
economic issues in the literature. 
The results show that social trust, perception of corruption and experience of 
corruption indeed have a relation. Our findings say that the gap between perception and 
experience of corruption will be lower in societies with high levels of trust. Furthermore, 
the experienced corruption has a negative effect on the perception levels of corruption, 
while trust is not relevant when related to the perceived corruption.  
The dissertation is organized as follows: Section 2 sets the concepts to understand 
the main issues related with Social Trust and Corruption and provides the reader a 
background of corruption. Section 3 introduces the relevant literature and the 
development of hypotheses. Section 4 starts by presenting the models and the respective 
methodologies followed by the sample and data. Section 5 shows the empirical evidence 
and finally section 6 summarizes the results and concludes, offering some 
recommendations for future researches. 
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2. Background on Corruption 
Corruption and trust have a large number of definitions given by various scholars. 
Hence, before going into the literature review regarding these subjects, it is necessary to 
define the concepts that are going to be used. Andersson and HeyWood (2009) give a 
definition of corruption that best fits in this research question: “corruption is the misuse 
of power in interests of illicit gain” (p. 748). Associated with the concept of corruption, 
two other notions are of crucial importance to our work: perceived corruption and 
experienced corruption. These concepts will be the same as the ones used by Steves and 
Teytelboym (2011). According to these authors, perceived corruption is the idea people 
have about the frequency of unofficial payments or gifts to a third party, whereas 
experienced corruption is the direct contact people have with the corrupt behaviour. 
Social trust is defined as the ´mental model´ of what can be expected when dealing with 
someone that you do not have personalized information about (Denzau and North, 1994; 
Uslaner, 2002; Graeff and Svendsen, 2013), and social capital are “the conditions that 
allow individuals to reap the benefits from interaction cooperatively in a civic 
community” (Cagala et al., 2016, p. 2).  
Corruption is a very old term and its concept comes from the Latin word rumpere 
which means “to break”, “break a rule or law” (Graeff and Svendsen, 2013). Scholars 
have been discussing, first of all, how corruption could be defined. For example, the 
World Bank (2017) defines a corrupt act such “offering, giving, receiving or soliciting, 
directly or indirectly, of anything of value to influence improperly the actions of another 
party”, while Transparency International (2017) defended that corruption is “the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain”, very similar to the one proposed by Andersson and 
HeyWood (2009) and mentioned above. The most common type of corruption studied is 
bribery1, since it is easier to measure, even though it is still hard because the corrupt 
activities are difficult to unmask and some cultural and institutional factors, which have 
influence on corruption, are not easy to quantify (Goel and Nelson, 2010). Corruption can 
also be split into two dimensions, grand and petty corruption. Transparency International 
(2017) defines the former as corrupt behaviour committed by high level officials who 
twist policies for their own advantage, and the latter as the abuse of power by low-and 
mid-level bureaucrats with the citizens in need of public goods. Maeda and Ziegfield 
                                                     
1 See some examples Heidenheimer (1996), Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (1999), Graeff and Svendsen 
(2013). 
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(2013) add that in both cases the most harmed are the socioeconomically disadvantaged: 
in the petty situation, the poorer do not have the conditions to pay bribes every time they 
want to access public goods, which tends to be people with low levels of education; in 
the grand corruption, since government has being deceived by officials or wealthy people, 
public funds will not be able to be used correctly on programs that benefit the poor. 
Besides these two dimensions, Brunetti and Weder (2003, p. 1804-1805) went further and 
differentiated extortive from collusive corruption, where the first means that “the 
government official has the discretionary power to refuse or delay a service in order to 
extract a rent from the private agent in the form of a bribe.” and in the extortive type “the 
private agent cooperates in the corrupt act and always pays the bribe.”. 
Throughout the last decades, both the consequences and the causes of corruption 
have been on governments’ agenda in order to shorten this big development’s threat. 
Some scholars believe that bad governance is causing higher levels of corruption in some 
countries, since corruption means that resources have been used not in the most efficient 
way (see Blackburn and Forges-Puccio, 2009; Goel and Nelson, 2010; Graeff and 
Svendsen, 2013). They defend that, in order to achieve the main goal - getting rid of 
corruption - first the system itself must be revised since political corruption is one, maybe 
the biggest, arm of corruption and bureaucrats have been target of political scandals due 
to corruption, which makes the situation even more urgent to solve (Heidenheimer, 1996). 
Albeit the causes are not clear, Goel and Nelson (2010) blame decentralization of power 
as one possible factor for political corruption, saying that the greater the level of 
decentralization, the higher the probability of a bribe might occur and more complicated 
it becomes to identify such act. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Blackburn and Forges-
Puccio (2009) go a little further and study the organisation of corruption taking the corrupt 
bureaucrats as a given, regarding the position of one who may need complementary 
services given by different bureaucrats. They affirm that, in case of disorganisation, each 
one will maximize his bribe, bringing negative externalities to the other bureaucrats, since 
the individual in need of the services will have a bigger amount of bribes paid, but if 
bureaucrats act jointly, the total amount of bribe paid would be lower, decreasing the 
probability of being detected and being less harmful for the country’s growth.2 
Officials have incentives to keep acting in a corrupt manner until the benefits of 
doing so outweigh the possible consequences of being caught, that is, as long as there are 
                                                     
2 Additional evidence of this theory can also be found in Campos et al. (1999); Rock and Bonnet (2004); 
Graeff and Svendsen (2013). 
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opportunities to misuse the power to own benefit at a little cost, corruption will always 
be a current evil within the society (Andersson and HeyWood, 2009) due to the almost 
non-existent explicit standards of performance which make officials with more freedom 
of acts (Brunetti and Weder, 2003). Authors support that strict regulations imposed by 
the governments in order to get the approval of bureaucrats for any license, permits or 
certificates, the so called “red tape”, might force one to find a faster, easier and, mainly, 
cheaper way to obtain what s/he needs, creating those referred opportunities for the 
corrupt behaviour (Huntington, 1968; Leff, 1964; Leys, 1965; La Porta et al., 1999). Goel 
and Nelson (2010) accept this theory, but they also argue that the restricting policies can 
also be a weapon against corruption, since the monitoring is tighter. With a different point 
of view regarding this subject, Aidt (2009) sees corruption as a facilitator of business, 
since it creates opportunities that would not happen otherwise. The author argues that the 
creation of such openings is due to the inefficiency of the government procedures, 
explaining the “speed-money” case, which consists in paying a bribe to speed up 
bureaucratic procedures.   
A deterrent to corruption might be the media. Nowadays, newspapers and local 
radios, for instance, spread the information towards all the population. Ferraz and Finan 
(2008) show that, with this access to information, politicians acting corrupt will be 
punished faster at places with free media, decreasing their likelihood for re-election. 
Hence, since it unveils the bad ones, the good policy makers will gain voters, which, in 
normal situations, is good for the country development (also supported by Chowdhury, 
2004). The media are also an important mechanism to fight collusive and extortive 
corruption. In case of a bureaucrat’s behaviour being exposed by a victim to the media, 
he would have a higher probability of being punished and therefore lose his credibility. 
On the other hand, if collusion exists, neither the bureaucrat nor the private agent will 
report the situation and this is where an independent media is fundamental to detect and 
denounce such cases (Brunetti and Weder, 2003). 
Access to information is linked to transparency, a concept often confused with 
corruption but completely different. Even though different, they are correlated, as a 
society with poor transparency policies is likely to have high levels of corruption. 
Regarding this matter, Kolstad and Wiig (2009) found some interesting evidences, 
showing that despite the fact of being correlated, transparency itself is not enough to have 
a direct impact on corruption, needing some complementary policies, although in some 
situations its effect on corruption might be ambiguous (Bac, 2001). 
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Besides all of this, there are also other cultural factors causing corruption that 
make scholars believe government not to be the main responsible. According to Pena 
López and Sánchez Santos (2013, p. 697), “the study of corruption requires a 
multidisciplinary approach as it cannot be isolated from the social environments in which 
it arises”. These authors used the Hofstede’s cultural dimensions to study the influence 
of culture on corruption, concluding that an individualistic culture with feminism trend, 
lower gap between superiors and subordinates and little risk averse presents inferior levels 
of corruption. Moreover, factors such as history, legal system, and religion have been 
accused of shaping corruption in different ways in each country. About the historical 
factor, Goel and Nelson (2010) found it really important to understand how corruption 
has been shaped and what is or is not acceptable by the society which can differentiate 
often. For instance, it is expected of democratic institutions to be anti-corruption, 
therefore, with a lower level of acceptance of the corrupt practices (Moreno, 2002). 
Regarding this topic, Serra (2006, p. 226) goes further and says that more important than 
the level of democracy is “whether a country has maintained democratic institutions for 
a long continuous time”. Furthermore, Kaufmann and Siegelbaum (1997) defend that new 
countries are more likely to suffer corruption due to the lack of supervision and 
government mechanisms which opens doors for bribe-giving and bribe-taking, and 
Moreno (2002) supports the idea that new democratic countries may suffer from their old 
regimes with the reputation of corrupt regimes, so citizens still think that corruption is not 
gone. Treisman (2000) analysed also how the colonial heritage could change or form the 
levels of corruption. Hence, he reached the conclusion that British colonies are the ones 
with best performances in terms of avoiding corruption inside their systems. The reason 
for such good behaviour is their legal system, which works through precedents rather than 
precise codes, giving narrow authority to judges who, in this way, do not have incentives 
to misuse their power (Goel and Nelson, 2010, also support this theory).   
  Religion also has its own share of guilty shaping corruption. Protestants show a 
lower perceived corruption, outperforming the other major religions such as Islam, 
Catholicism and the Anglican Church (Lipset and Lenz, 2000). Treisman (2000) tried to 
understand why this happens, giving some possible reasons: first, since Protestantism 
does not have a tight connection with the system, is more likely to uncover and punish 
bureaucrats’ corrupt behaviour; second, Protestants might not be as tolerant as, for 
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instance, Christians, regarding forgiveness3, and finally, the strong relationship one has 
with their family in other traditions other than Protestantism might lead to lower 
corruption in the latter. 
Lastly, an additional factor that influences corruption is the level of openness of 
economies, in other words, the more open a country is in terms of financial integration, 
the less corrupt it tends to be (Neeman et al., 2008). On the other hand, Treisman (2000) 
refers to studies made by Ades and Di Tella (1996, 1999), saying that the openness a 
country has to foreign trade is negatively related with the level of corruption, and 
countries that own valuable natural resources are more likely to have higher levels of 
corruption, since the owners of such resources are in a position to use their power for 
illicit practises, so one way to get rid of this problem would be to increase the competition 
in the markets, decreasing the profits of such bribes. 
So far, the reviewed literature speaks of the general concept of corruption, 
although, as explained before, some authors focused more in the perceived corruption 
instead, as they claim corruption itself is almost impossible to measure, so that there is a  
need of a better approximation to do so4. Andersson and HeyWood (2009), for instance, 
consider that perceptions might influence behaviour, in such way that if one believes that 
everyone around them is corrupt; there will be a higher probability that they also commit 
corruption. These authors use the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) created by the 
Transparency International (TI) back in 1995, an annual index that reports how countries 
(168 currently) have been performing in terms of fighting corruption at the macro level 
(De William, 2008). This index inquires business people, academics and risk analysts 
about how they perceive the level of corruption in their countries (Chowdhury, 2004; 
Andersson and HeyWood, 2009).  These studies, Andersson and HeyWood (2009) and 
De William (2008), explain in a detailed way what the CPI is, why it is the best indicator 
nowadays and how CPI has influenced the overall economics. CPI is said to be the best 
due to three reasons: it was the first to make a big effort compiling several factors, this 
way creating a reliable and complex measure of perceived corruption; second, for the 
Transparency International creating the index was not enough, the institution have been 
                                                     
3 Lipset and Lenz (2000, p. 120) gives us a more technical explanation about this: ”Protestants, particularly 
sectarians, believe that individuals are personally responsible for avoiding sin, whereas other Christian 
denominations, particularly the Catholic Church, place more emphasis on the inherent weakness of human 
beings, their inability to escape sin and error, and the need for the church to be forgiving and protecting.”.  
4 Nevertheless, Maeda and Ziegfield (2013, p. 5) argue that studies using perception of corruption must 
keep in mind that individuals from different social level might have distinct points of view in this matter: 
“the affluent and educated will systematically perceive less corruption than the poor and poorly educated”. 
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linked to anti-corruption initiatives, which have made it go hand-in-hand with the words 
“perceived corruption”; and finally, the vast list of non-governmental organizations that 
work with TI, make it a strong and almost non contested monopolist in this field 
(Andersson and HeyWood, 2009).  
CPI has such a strong influence on politics that a low score may represent a fall 
in the government, since a poor performance might mean that the best policies to fight 
corruption are not being executed so a change is needed (e.g. where this happened: 
Pakistan, Bolivia, Cameroon and Nigeria, from Galtung, 2005). Another example of this 
influence is the fact that the US’s foreign agency “Millennium Challenge Corporation” 
(MCC), which gives aid to fight global poverty, has as one of the selection factors the 
performance of the country on the CPI (Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2017). 
Regarding this, if CPI might be an exclusion factor for poorer countries in need of help 
whose scores are not worthy of such trust, more inequality will result from this (Jens 
Andvig, 2005), inducing these countries to a so called “corruption trap”, since the 
countries do not have the kind of help needed to implement policies that would fight 
corruption, thus making it impossible for a development exist due to the degree of 
corruption embedded in society (Andersson and HeyWood, 2009). According to De 
William (2008), this pressure imposed by aid agencies to perform in terms of corruption 
policies might have a non-desirable effect since governments, in order to reach the 
expected results, see themselves obligated to deviate their focus from policies maybe 
more important, for instance public health, to policies focusing on corruption. 
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3. Relevant Literature and Hypotheses 
Focusing now on the literature of the other part on my dissertation, social trust, 
which differs from the personalized trust in the extent that with the social trust we assume 
that we do not know the third party that we are dealing with, while personalized trust 
refers to someone we have personal knowledge of enough to know how s/he behaves 
(definitions from Denzau and North, 1994; Uslaner, 2002; Graeff and Svendsen, 2013). 
Due to the difficulty in measuring social capital, social trust is the most adequate concept 
to do it, since trusting in the unknown facilitates the existence of a civic community, 
building this way social capital (Paldam and Svendsen, 2000). According to La Porta et 
al. (1997), trust is fundamental especially in large organizations, such as, for instance, 
governments, since bureaucrats do not see each other often, which would help making 
the system more effective. There is a disagreement about whether participation in civic 
groups like voluntary, scouting or sports associations creates social trust rather than social 
capital (Putnam, 1993) or only people with already high levels of social trust participate 
in such organizations (e.g. Uslaner, 2002). Rothstein and Eek (2009) found social trust an 
important topic since it is positively related with some required conditions, not only social 
but political and economical too and this theory was a few years earlier supported by 
Delhey and Newton (2003) saying that a country would face economic growth if its levels 
of social trust were high, going against Graeff and Svendsen (2013) who concluded in 
their study that “the level of social trust does not have a significant impact on the level of 
economic development but it can contribute to wealth improvements indirectly by 
reducing the spread of corruption.” (p. 2843). 
This quote works as a starting point to introduce the different contributions to the 
literature that studies the relation between social trust and corruption, which are seen as 
examples of social capital, positive and negative, respectively (Steves and Teytelboym, 
2011). Literature has studied either the impact of (social) trust in the level of corruption 
within a society or how corrupt behaviour affects people’s trust on social institutions. 
Some authors affirm that higher levels of corruption in the political sector lead to low 
levels of social trust, since people often take the behaviour of the officials as an indicator 
of what is expected from a normal citizen (McCann and Domínguez, 1998; Bowler and 
Karp, 2004; Rothstein and Eek, 2009) while Moreno (2002), in his empiric study, 
concludes that the majority of individuals see the assignment of a public office to 
someone increasing the likelihood of such individual turning out to be corrupt. 
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Furthermore, Banarjee (2016) also found that corruption negatively affects trust because 
it means violation of the norms which has a negative impact on the belief about others’ 
trustworthiness. However, Rothstein (2000) shows us a different approach to this topic 
where corrupt bureaucrats would be willing to stop acting corrupt if they could be 
convinced that their colleagues had the same will. In case that someone acts corrupt, one 
will have to respond for his/her own acts in court and the profits from such act cannot be 
shared with the police or judges so one will be punished and realize that corrupt behaviour 
is not worth it, bridging this way social capital. This theory was developed by Graeff and 
Svendsen (2013) in order to prove that high quality institutions build trust among citizens, 
leading to lower levels of corruption. This relation sets the first hypothesis: 
 
 [H1] The perception of corruption is higher where the level of trust is lower. 
 
Regarding this relation, Bjørnskov (2013) says that greater levels of trust (social 
capital) decrease corruption since bribery would not be so likely to happen, that is, one is 
less likely to either accept or attempt to bribe. Though, other theories support that low 
levels of trust can make corruption thrive due to the difficulty of agents building 
cooperative mind-sets (e.g. La Porta et al., 1997; Moreno, 2002). For the corrupt 
countries, not only are their resources not invested in the optimal way, but lower levels 
of trust also increase the transaction costs Graeff and Svendsen (2013).  
As far as the author is aware, the only study that has examined the relation 
between the social trust and the gap between perceived and experienced corruption is 
Steves and Teytelboym (2011). The results of their analysis are interesting: among the 
countries used in the study, the ones that show higher levels of experience of corruption 
are also the ones with greatest differences between perceived and experienced corruption. 
This can be explained by the fact that in some countries, unofficial payments, for instance, 
are seen as a sign of gratitude, this is, such payments are voluntary and not seen as 
corruption.  
Moreover, they found that perceived corruption has a negative relation with social 
trust and this might be due to trust in public institutions being somehow set by the 
perception of corruption of citizens in those same institutions, which can lead to a bigger 
gap between perceived and experience corruption. The purpose of the dissertation is to 
extend this type of analysis to a broader set of countries and include in it the influence of 
a broader set of variables. 
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Based on the above, three more hypotheses will be tested: 
 
 [H2] The perception of corruption increase when there is a high level of the 
experienced corruption. 
 [H3] The gap between the perception and experience of corruption decreases with 
high levels of trust.  
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4. Methodology 
4.1 Models 
 Regarding the methodology, in order to test the 3 hypothesis previously presented, 
this study will use two different models. In the first model, the aim is to test how the 
difference between perception and experience of corruption is affected by some variables 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑠 − 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑠 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖 +
 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑓𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 +  𝜀    (1) 
 
 In this first model, the dependent variable -𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑠 - is the difference between the 
perceived corruption and the real experienced corruption in a country i on the s sector, 
which will be three: education system, judiciary and the police.  To measure it was used 
the Global Corruption Barometer, from Transparency International that has a direct way 
of measuring corruption, asking people, every year, all around the world how many times 
have they done or participated in a corrupt act.  
The explanatory variable - 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 - is the level of social trust in the country and is 
the variable with the most interest. The information was taken from the 6th wave of 
surveys of the World Values Survey which tries to understand the variations in the beliefs, 
values and motivations of people throughout the world every four years (the question 
used was: “would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very 
careful in dealing with people?”).  
The first control variable - 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 - represents the level of press freedom 
embedded in a country. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) is a French NGO that defends 
press freedom and every year estimates the level of such freedom for a wide range of 
countries, making a ranking (the first in the ranking represents the country with the 
highest level of press freedom) (Reporters Without Borders, 2016) . The second control 
variable - 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑓𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 - is withdrawn from the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 
research, which through sixty indicators measures the ranking of the level of democracy, 
where 0 represents an authoritarian regime and 10 a full democracy regime (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2017). The last variable will be a dummy variable that will show the 
level of development of a country (developed=1 and developing=0) according to the 
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United Nations and the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, 2017). 
The second model will show the relation between social trust and experienced 
corruption with the perceived corruption of a country: 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖 +
 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑓𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 +  𝜀    (2) 
     
In this model, the score of a country i on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
will be set as dependent variable – 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖 - and such index is made by the Transparency 
International annually. This index includes 176 countries, where the scores go from 0 to 
100, the better performances in terms of fighting corruption being at the top of the table. 
The first explanatory variable – 𝐸𝑥𝑝 – consists in the percentage of people who 
said that they paid a bribe to any service in the last year. The difference between these 
two variables and the ones from the first model is that these ones show the aggregate 
values; that is, not just a sector, but in general. The variable of trust is exactly the same 
of the previous model. The remaining variables are the same as those used in the previous 
model. 
 
4.2 Sample and Data 
In order to estimate the models presented in the previous section, information 
regarding corruption, social trust, press freedom and democracy level of countries were 
gathered.  
In terms of corruption, Transparency International gives us a great data of wide range 
of countries. The CPI displays the scores of 176 countries in the most recent report and 
the Global Corruption Barometer surveyed over than 135 thousand people to study the 
experience of corruption around the world. Trust is the variable with the least data 
available. World Values Survey gives us, on its last wave of surveys, information about 
57 countries and over than 85 thousand people’s beliefs, values and motivations. Every 
year is computed The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, characterizing the 
regime in one of these four forms: authoritarian or hybrid regime or flawed or full 
democracy, giving us a score from 0 to 10 of such characterization. In terms of press, RSF 
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has been publishing since 2002 an index with the ranking of each country, counting in its 
last report with 180 countries5. 
Due to the lack of some countries’ information, gathering all the information available 
to all the variables, the final sample is composed by 30 countries (the list can be seen in 
Appendix 1) and the answers gathered in 2001 and 20013 will be used. Panel data will be 
used. 
 
Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent, Independent and Control 
Variables of the Model 1 
VARIABLES N mean p25 p50 p90 sd min max 
         
Trust 30 20.41 8.800 17.80 37.20 13.61 3.200 55.30 
PressFreedom2013 30 96.87 47 110 156.5 51.85 8 169 
PressFreedom2011 30 96.50 46 115.5 151.5 49.94 13 171 
DemocracyIndex2011 30 6.140 4.550 6.545 8.095 1.855 2.570 9.260 
DemocracyIndex2013 30 6.239 4.640 6.515 8.095 1.827 2.670 9.260 
Levelofdevelopment 30 0.233 0 0 1 0.430 0 1 
Difeduc2011 29 0.248 0.164 0.243 0.480 0.144 -0.0720 0.631 
Difjud2011 29 0.307 0.171 0.303 0.556 0.187 -0.229 0.587 
Difpol2011 29 0.297 0.227 0.335 0.517 0.164 -0.236 0.578 
Difeduc2013 30 -0.0637 -0.210 -0.0600 0.205 0.207 -0.480 0.410 
Difjud2013 30 0.390 0.300 0.405 0.655 0.196 -0.0700 0.780 
Difpol2013 30 0.360 0.220 0.340 0.620 0.215 -0.0700 0.710 
Note. s.d.: standard-deviation; p25: percentile 25; p50: percentile 50; p75: percentile 75; p99: percentile 
99. The number of observations is 30 for all the variables except in 2011 where there is no data for Morocco. 
 
Regarding the variables of the first model, on the surveys made in the last World 
Values Surveys’ wave, taking into account the model’s sample, the mean of the people 
who considered the others trustworthy is of 20%, where the highest value was 55.3%. It 
should be noted that the level of press freedom of the chosen sample is low in the both 
years, since the percentile 50 has the value of 110 in 2013 and 115 in 2011, in a sample 
where the lowest value is 8 and 13, respectively in each year. The levels of democracy 
                                                     
5 We used the ranking of the countries in such index following the example of Blanc et al. (2017). 
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taken in 2011 and 2013 stay still practically at the same levels, as both checked a mean 
of 6 in a scale of 0 to 10. 
 Analysing now the dependent variables, the percentile 50 of the differences 
between the perception and the experience of corruption on the sector of the education 
went from a positive value in 2011 to a negative value in 2013, 0.24 to -0.06 respectively. 
This means that either the mentality or the experience of the society changed, since the 
majority had a perception of corruption higher than the experience in 2011, and in 2013 
the records say exactly the opposite. On the judiciary’s sector the values remain constant 
on both years, where more than the majority has the idea that the quantity of bribes that 
are made are higher than what they actually experience. For the police sector, the mean 
recorded in 2011 is 0.297 and two years later it increased to 0.360. 
  
Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent and Independent Variables of the 
Model 2 
VARIABLES N mean p25 p50 p90 sd min max 
         
CPI2013 30 45.17 34 40 73.50 19.00 16 91 
Barometer2013 30 0.248 0.0700 0.190 0.540 0.203 0.0100 0.740 
CPI2011 30 43.14 26.44 35.29 76.27 21.04 18.04 94.63 
Barometer2011 30 0.279 0.0898 0.235 0.563 0.201 0.0242 0.657 
Note. s.d.: standard-deviation; p25: percentile 25; p50: percentile 50; p75: percentile 75; p99: percentile 
99.  
 
  On the second model, the variable trust has exactly the same descriptive statistics 
as the first model since the sample of it is the same. Regarding the dependent variables, 
both the CPI2011 and CPI2013 have not just the mean below 50 but also the percentile 
50 which means that the majority of the countries had a poor performance fighting 
corruption (Iraq is the worst with a score of 16 in 2013 and 18 in 2011 and New Zealand 
the best one, scoring 91 and 94 in 2013 and 2011 respectively). In terms of experienced 
corruption, the country that experienced the most bribery was Yemen with 65.7% and 
74% of people saying that they already paid illegally at any service in 2011 and 2013, 
respectively. The mean of this variable is 0.279 in 2011 and 0.248 in 2013. 
 The rest of the variables are the same ones used on the first model, so the 
descriptive statistics are the same. 
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In the models it is going to be used the aggregate data, this is, 2011 and 2013 will 
be put together, creating this way panel data. The aggregated descriptive statistics can be 
found at the Appendix 2 and 3. 
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5. Empirical Results 
This section discusses the results of the previously depicted models. To this 
purpose, we estimated Ordinary Least Squares fitted to panel data. This model allows for 
estimating the linear impact of the several explanatory variables on the dependent variable 
that follows a continuous distribution. Residual-versus-fitted plots of simple OLS 
estimates show heteroskedascity in residuals. As such, all model estimates bellow include 
clustered standard errors that are robust to these spherical errors (Cameron and Miller, 
2015). All model specifications use random effects. Fixed effects are not included for 
several theoretical and statistical reasons. First, there are no theoretically relevant reasons 
to expect country-specific unobserved heterogeneity. Second, there are some theoretically 
relevant variables, such as trust and level of development, that do not vary within clusters. 
Adding fixed effect would omit them from the model. Third, the sample only includes 60 
observations with 30 clusters. Adding fixed effects greatly reduces degrees of freedom, 
and may lead to potential problems with overfitting. 
 
Table 3 – Random Effects Model 
VARIABLES Education Police Judicial 
    
Trust -0.11 -0.50** -0.88*** 
 (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) 
Press  Freedom -0.05 -0.01 -0.14** 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) 
Democracy Index -0.45 2.78* 0.72 
 (2.08) (1.67) (1.81) 
Level of development -0.75 -3.34 -3.87 
 (10.09) (6.94) (3.97) 
    
    
Observations 59 59 59 
Number of Country_Num 30 30 30 
RMSE 11.47 18.25 12.62 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. RMSE: root mean square 
error. All models contain constants. Source: Own computations. 
 
The table 3 gives us the estimated results for the first model on the three sectors. 
As it was expected, trust has a negative effect on the gap between perception and 
experience of corruption. This result confirms the findings of literature and our [H3], 
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which says that countries with high levels of social trust tend to have the levels of 
perceptions closer to what is their experience of corruption, is accepted only for the police 
and judicial sector and not for the education one. This gap will be smaller in the judicial 
sector, and the results show that, under the linearity assumption, a unit increase in trust is 
associated with a 0.88 unit decrease in the  gap between perception and experience of 
corruption, ceteris paribus, while on the police sector this value goes down to 0.5. 
Although the strength and direction of this variable are constant through the sectors, only 
on the judicial and police sectors trust is statistically significant, for a significance level 
of 1% and 5%, respectively. 
 The first control variable also follows the same effect of trust, tough in a reduced 
dimension. In the literature it is defended that press freedom helps to fight corruption in 
a way that it would make it easier to denounce corrupt acts, and the coefficients estimated 
prove this point of view. Only in the judicial sector this variable seems to be significant 
for a level of 5%, saying that a rank up on the press freedom index, will make the gap 
between perception and corruption 0.14 smaller, ceteris paribus. 
The higher the level of democracy, the stronger should be the politics’ anti-
corruption. Moreno (2002) is one of the supporters of this theory and the results show 
quite the opposite because on the police sector, the only sector where the variable is 
significant at the 90% interval confidence, the level of democracy has a positive relation 
with the gap between corruption and experience of corruption. On such sector, a country 
that observes an increase of 1 level on the democracy level will have an increase of 2.78 
on the gap between the perceived and the experienced corruption. 
 The last control variable is the level of development, and though its estimators 
follow the pattern presented on the literature, that is, a country more developed tends to 
have a lower corruption, this variable is not statistically significant for any model. 
 In order to test the multicollinearity, we used the test of the variance inflation 
factor (VIF). Thus, a VIF higher than 10 means the existence of collinearity. Analysing 
the results, which can be seen at the Appendix 4, none of the variables surpass such limit, 
meaning that there is not a problem of multicollinearity (this applies for this and the 
following models presented and the results are on the same Appendix). 
 In order to take into account the external shocks, in the second analysis we proceed 
to the inclusion of a temporal dummy. 
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Table 4 – Random Effects with Temporal Dummy  
VARIABLES Education Police Judicial 
    
Trust -0.14 -0.50** -0.88*** 
 (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) 
Press  Freedom -0.01 -0.02 -0.15** 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) 
Democracy Index 0.16 2.69 0.56 
 (2.19) (1.66) (1.81) 
Level of development 0.68 -3.36 -3.83 
 (10.52) (6.93) (4.19) 
    
Observations 59 59 59 
Number of Country_Num 30 30 30 
RMSE 11.47 18.25 12.62 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. RMSE: root mean square 
error. All models contain constants. Source: Own computations. 
 
Observing the table 4, we conclude that the results are quite similar to the previous 
ones. The most notable difference is the loss of significance for the model of the 
democracy index variable on the police sector.  The rest of the estimates keep the same 
signal effect, coefficients and significance. 
In a way of assessing the importance/relevance of the inclusion of the temporary 
variation associated with external shocks we use the testparm that gave us p-values of 
0.00, 0.01 and 0.18, on the education, police and judicial sectors, respectively. These 
values mean that the null hypothesis of non-existing segregated effects through time is 
rejected for the education and police sectors, making the model efficient and confirming 
that time has an effect on the dependent variable. 
Following the same method of the first model, the table 5 displays the estimations 
regarding the regression of the CPI variable. In the first column it is shown the OLS model 
with random effects and in the second column is added the temporal dummy (CPI Time). 
 
Table 5 – Regressions of the Second Model 
VARIABLES CPI CPI Time 
   
Trust 0.25 0.25 
 (0.16) (0.17) 
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Barometer -0.11** -0.09* 
 (0.06) (0.05) 
Press  Freedom -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.07) (0.05) 
Democracy Index 4.52*** 4.28*** 
 (1.36) (1.47) 
Level of development 10.80 11.58 
 (7.15) (7.27) 
   
Observations 60 60 
Number of Country_Num 30 30 
RMSE 3.63 3.63 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. RMSE: root mean square 
error. All models contain constants. Source: Own computations. 
  
 As happened previously, these two estimations do not have many differences. Our 
[H1] and [H2] can be answered by interpreting these results. Contradicting the first model 
and the [H1], the variable trust is not statistically relevant to explain the variation of the 
perception levels, which goes in contradiction of what we were expecting. Thus, we can 
conclude that trust is important analysing the gap between the perception and experienced 
corruption but not on the perceived corruption itself.  
 This also occurred for the variables: press freedom and level of development. 
These two do not have significance for the model. Just to note that, even though press 
freedom is not significant, its coefficient has a signal, negative, worth of interpretation 
and discussion. This could be interpreted in a way that, a country with high level of press 
freedom are more likely to publish news of bribery cases and consequently might lead to 
an increase of the perception of corruption within the society, which differs a bit of what 
was cited on the literature review. 
 The democracy index presents notable significance on the dependent variable at 
the 99% interval confidence. In this model the signal effect is more linked with the 
literature review than the results of the previous model. Countries with more democratic 
institutions should be more pro-active on fighting corruption, leading this way to a society 
with lower perception levels of corruption, which is confirmed by the 4.52 coefficient, 
estimating that an increase of 1 value on the democracy index, will decrease the CPI on 
4.52, ceteris paribus.     
 At last, linked to one of the hypotheses, [H2], the variable barometer, the 
experience of corruption, has a positive impact on the perception of corruption. This result 
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follows the idea that “if I act corrupt, everyone acts corrupt”, so a society that increases 
1% of its experienced corruption on any service, will decrease its CPI score in 11%, 
ceteris paribus. This variable is significant for the model for a significance level of 5%. 
At first, the model contained an additional variable that measured the 
simultaneous effect of trust and experience of corruption. This interaction had the 
objective of checking whether a country with a given level of trust would have a bigger 
or smaller effect of the experienced corruption on the perception levels and vice-versa. 
Since the results (Appendix 5) show that the interaction term would not be significant for 
the model and it would worsen the effects of the remaining variables, we decided to let 
the interaction out of the empirical results. 
Concluding the discussion of the results and trying to understand the failed results 
on the trust variable, we looked for the possibility of outliers on the sample and after some 
try-outs we reached some interesting findings. Leaving the American countries out of the 
sample, not only did the model remain significant, but the trust variable also became 
significant for the model, at the significance level of 10%. Table 6 shows the results 
presented.  
 
Table 6 – Results without American Countries 
VARIABLES CPI 
  
Trust 0.28* 
 (0.17) 
Barometer -0.14** 
 (0.06) 
Press  Freedom -0.06 
 (0.05) 
Democracy Index 4.08*** 
 (1.39) 
Level of development 8.88 
 (7.04) 
  
  
Observations 48 
Number of Country_Num 24 
RMSE 3.63 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. RMSE: root mean square 
error. All models contain constants. Source: Own computations. 
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6. Conclusions 
Corruption has been and it will always be an important economic matter. Scholars 
started to discuss this topic but the data was almost nonexistence. More recently, as this 
issue gained more attention, organizations have started to focus on this problem and used 
their resources to create databases. Such information made researchers able to develop 
new theories and reach new findings. Due to the difficulties of measuring corruption, the 
perception of it was the proxy chosen to study the cause-effect relation with a lot of 
variables. 
The objective of this research is to find a possible relation between social trust and 
the gap between perception and experience of corruption. Reviewing the literature, this 
relation is still a question without an answer. Therefore, the hypotheses were set where, 
firstly, was stated that trust would have a positive effect on the gap between the perception 
and experience of corruption, that is, the gap would be smaller. Instead of using the 
aggregated perceived and experienced corruption, we decided to use the specific values 
of certain sectors to have a more detailed result.  
Our findings indicated that social trust has, indeed, a positive effect but only on 
two out of the three sectors used. On the police and judicial sector, the trust seems to be 
an important feature in order to people have a level of perception of corruption closer of 
what is the reality of it. The data shows us that almost all countries have a perception 
level higher that the experience, which means that people have the idea that the others act 
more corrupt than they actually do and this empirical evidence states that one of the 
reasons for it is that people do not trust enough others.  
With the purpose of validating this thought, we also tested if trust would influence 
the perception of corruption itself. Actually, the results deny the last assumption, saying 
that the perception levels are not influenced significantly by trust, so maybe the 
individuals’ experience is the one influenced by the trust levels, leading to one act less 
corrupt if he starts to trust more. Although the hypothesis was contradicted, another result 
linked to it deserves to be highlighted: removing the American countries out of the 
sample, the theory becomes true, that is, trust turns out to be relevant, which makes the 
assumption correct again.    
The last conjecture had the goal of putting the experience and perception of 
corruption face to face, stating that higher levels of experienced corruption would lead to 
a greater perception of it. The conclusions are the expected: an individual who acts corrupt 
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tend to believe that the rest of the society has the same behavior as him. This might be an 
explanation for the countries with high levels of perception: if perception levels are high 
it can be caused by the actual existence of a great number of corrupt acts within the 
society.  
In our empirical research some limitations made it more difficult to obtain better 
and more solid results: the lack of data available was the main reason for the reduced 
sample because the variable trust has statistics for a low number of countries, which made 
it impossible to add more control variables to the models; the data about experience 
corruption is still questionable since it is the hardest variable to measure due to all the 
implications of the gathering process;  also, some variables have changed the way how 
its sources gather the information about them, making the comparison of data through the 
years harder and, finally, the causality of the variables for the relation trust-perception; 
only one way of causality was tested, and not the other way around. 
Despite all the limitations, our findings gave the literature a launching ramp to 
develop and create new studies about this research question, since we have reached 
interesting results, ones worthy of further expansion in a matter as current and important 
the economics and the society as a whole. 
For future researches our main suggestions are deeper studies on the theoretical 
reason for the American countries being outliers and the fact that social trust is not 
significant on the gap between the perception and experience of corruption on the 
education sector. Moreover, a wider database will be crucial, since it would allow adding 
more variables and this way reaching more viable results. Along this, testing a broader 
range of causalities will help to understand how variables really are linked to each other 
better.  
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Appendixes 
 
Appendix 1 – List of Countries  
 
 
 
  
Argentina Georgia Malaysia Pakistan Slovenia Turkey
Armenia Ghana Mexico Peru South Africa Ukraine
Australia India Morocco Philippines Spain United States
Chile Iraq New Zealand Romania Taiwan Yemen
Colombia Japan Nigeria Rwanda Thailand Zimbabwe
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Appendix 2 – Descriptive Statistics of the Aggregated Data of the Model 1 
 
VARIABLES N mean p25 p50 p90 sd min max 
         
Trust 60 20.41 8.80 17.80 37.20 13.49 3.200 55.30 
PressFreedom 60 96.68 46.50 115 153.5 50.47 8 171 
DemocracyIndex 60 6.19 4.60 6.54 8.10 1.87 2.570 9.26 
Levelofdevelopment 60 0.23 0 0 1 0.48 0 1 
DifEduc 59 8.95 -7 12 33.40 23.68 -48 63.10 
DifJud 59 34.92 23.70 35 58 19.46 -22.90 78 
DifMed 30 -17.27 -25 -14.50 15.50 25.11 -82 21 
DifPol 59 32.91 22 33.70 60 19.28 -23.60 71 
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Appendix 3 – Descriptive Statistics of the Aggregated Data of the Model 2 
 
VARIABLES N mean p25 p50 p90 sd min max 
         
CPI 60 44.16 29.83 37.50 73.50 19.90 16 94.63 
Barometer 60 26.35 8.025 22.01 55.30 20.09 1 74 
Trust 60 20.41 8.800 17.80 37.20 13.49 3.200 55.30 
PressFreedom 60 96.68 46.50 115 153.5 50.47 8 171 
DemocracyIndex 60 6.189 4.595 6.540 8.095 1.826 2.570 9.260 
Levelofdevelopment 60 0.233 0 0 1 0.427 0 1 
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Appendix 4 – VIF tests for both models 
 
 
 
  
Variables RE
DemocracyIndex 7.22
Trust 4.43
PressFreedom 4.07
Levelofdevelopment 2.94
Variables RE
DemocracyIndex 7.22
Trust 4.83
PressFreedom 5.69
Levelofdevelopment 3.11
Barometer 3.88
VIF test Model 1
VIF test Model 2
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Appendix 5 – Results of the inclusion of the Interaction term 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. RMSE: root mean square 
error. All models contain constants. Source: Own computations. 
 
VARIABLES CPI Interaction 
  
Trust 0.31 
 (0.19) 
Barometer -0.06 
 (0.12) 
c.Trust#c.Barometer -0.002 
 (0.004) 
Press  Freedom -0.04 
 (0.05) 
Democracy Index 4.46*** 
 (1.38) 
Level of development 10.28 
 (7.00) 
  
Observations 60 
Number of Country_Num 30 
RMSE 3.41 
